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ABSTRACT 
The last few years have seen a growing interest in the semantic analysis of 
epistemic modal claims.  By my lights, the most appealing analysis of epistemic 
modals is the relativistic approach.  However, in their paper, “CIA Leaks”, Kai 
von Fintel and Anthony Gillies present some problems they think the relativistic 
approach must explain.  I aim to defend a variation on the relativistic analysis of 
epistemic modals.    I argue that when we determine the truth-value of sentences 
containing epistemic modals, we are free to evaluate modal claims from contexts 
other than the standard context of utterance.  This freedom to evaluate the modal 
claims from different contexts is what I call contextual projection.  When 
contextual projection takes place the sentence can be either true or false, 
appropriate or inappropriate.  Furthermore, I will argue that the general 
phenomenon that is contextual projection is a common occurrence observable in 
ordinary language use.  
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Introduction 
 
 The last few years have seen a growing interest in the semantic analysis of 
epistemic modal claims such as “John might be in his office”.  By my lights, the 
most appealing analysis of epistemic modals is the relativistic approach.1  
However, in their paper, “CIA Leaks” 2, Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies 
present some problems that they think any relativistic approach must deal with 
in order to constitute an acceptable semantic analysis of epistemic modals.     
My aim in this paper is to defend a variation on the standard relativistic 
analysis of epistemic modals.  The proposed analysis is based on the relativistic 
framework laid out by John MacFarlane in his papers, “Epistemic Modalities and 
Relative Truth” and “The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions”.  
According to this framework, the truth-value of epistemic modals is relative to a 
context of assessment as well as the standard context of utterance.  My defense of 
the relativistic alternative to standard semantics will draw on the notion of 
contextual projection.  I will argue that when we determine the  truth-value of a 
sentence that contains an epistemic modal, we are free to evaluate modal claims 
from contexts other than the standard context of utterance.  This freedom to 
evaluate the modal claims from different contexts is what I call contextual 
                                                
1 Recent defenses of the relativistic account include Andy Egan, et al., “Epistemic Modals in Context” and 
John MacFarlane’s paper “Epistemic Modals are Assessment-Sensitive”. 
2 Their paper is called “CIA Leaks” because they view MacFarlane’s account as a triple-indexed semantics.  
The three indices are the context of utterance, the index(world time pair), and the context of assessment.  
Hence, “CIA Leaks”. 
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projection.  When contextual projection takes place the sentence under 
evaluation can be either true or false, appropriate or inappropriate at a given 
point of assessment.  Furthermore, I will argue that the general phenomenon that 
is contextual projection is a common occurrence that is observable in ordinary 
language use.   
 My plan for the paper is as follows.  First, I will provide von Fintel and 
Gillies’ assessment of the data they take to be the motivation for a relativistic 
semantics for epistemic modals.  Next, I will briefly sketch the problems that von 
Fintel and Gillies raise for the relativistic account.  Following my exegesis of von 
Fintel and Gillies’ position, I will provide my defense of a relativistic semantics 
for epistemic modals.  I will then conclude the paper by defending my relativistic 
account against the objection that contextual projection is ad hoc.    
Questioning the Motivating Data for a Relativistic Analysis 
 von Fintel  and Gillies start out by examining denial-correction sequences 
of discourse that contain the epistemic modal ‘might’.  They claim that the 
motivating “data” can be seen as neither “innocent nor unambiguous”.  So, let us 
take a look at one of their examples: 
a. Alex:  The keys might be in the drawer. 
b. Billy:  [Looks in the drawer, agitated] They’re not.  Why did you say that? 
c. Alex:  Look, I didn’t say they were in the drawer.  I said they might be there—and 
they might have been.  Sheesh.3 
                                                
3 von Fintel, Kai and Anthony Gillies.  “CIA Leaks”.  Philosophical Review, Vol. 117, No. 1, 2008. Pp. 81. 
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In response to this sort of example von Fintel and Gillies make a number of 
observations.  The first observation is that “solipsistic readings for the modals—
readings on which the modals quantify over the evidence available to the 
speaker at the time of utterance—are virtually always available.”4  They take this 
to be the case because it seems to them that Alex is holding onto the idea that her 
initial utterance was appropriate in the context in which it was uttered.  Their 
second observation is that speaker intuitions are far from uniform.  This poses a 
problem for the relativistic account because assessorhood is clearly determinable, 
which makes it hard for relativistic theories to accommodate cases other than 
clear-cut retraction intuitions5.  The third and final concern they have with the 
motivating data on which relativistic accounts are generated is that denial and 
acceptance in discourse is not a straightforward procedure.  They claim that 
relativistic accounts get their motivation from examples like the following: 
a. A:  It might be that P. 
b. B:  No, not-P/No, it can’t be that P.6 
This type of exchange causes problems for the relativistic approach because if it 
is taken that what ‘might’ means in A’s utterance is a function of the evidence 
only available to her, then though B denies what A asserts, there is no evidence 
                                                
4 Ibid. Pp. 82. 
5 The following is an example of a clear-cut retraction:  I utter the sentence, ‘John might be at home’.  
Later, I am told that John has been in Hawaii for the last two weeks.  I would retract my earlier statement in 
light of the new evidence.  The retraction is clear-cut because I immediately realize my mistake and take 
the necessary steps to correct it.  Therefore, the concern is that since speaker intuitions vary and if the 
speaker and the assessor are one and the same, the CIA theory runs into problems in cases other than clear-
cut retraction. 
6 Ibid. Pp. 82. 
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of a genuine disagreement.  However, von Fintel and Gillies claim that this 
example is not decisive.   
von Fintel and Gillies believe that the proper motivation for a relativistic 
semantics must come from exchanges in which denials in discourse track 
genuine disagreement.  So, they offer the following example which is meant to 
show that “denials don’t always attach to the attitude claim (and sometimes 
cannot); the same goes for agreement”7: 
a. A:  I think it’s raining out. 
b. (i) B:  No, it isn’t/No, it can’t be. 
(ii) B:  ??No, you don’t.8 
B’s felicitous denial in (i) does not represent a genuine disagreement with A’s 
utterance.  However, B’s utterance in (ii) does represent a genuine disagreement 
but the utterance is not felicitous due to its target, the mental state(s) of A of 
which B is not in a position to judge.  Now, von Fintel and Gillies think that 
when modals are introduced the problem becomes even worse because 
subsequent replies can be directed at either the modal claim itself or the 
prejacent.  Thus, they offer the following example so that it may be shown that 
“flexibility in the target of denials and acceptances does not explain what needs 
explaining”9: 
 
                                                
7 Ibid. Pp. 83. 
8 Ibid. Pp. 82. 
9 Ibid. Pp. 83. 
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Pascal and Mordecai are playing Mastermind.  After some rounds where 
Mordecai gives Pascal hints about the solution, Pascal says: 
 There might be two reds. 
Mordecai, knowing the solution, has a range of possible responses: 
a. That’s right.  There might be. 
b. That’s right.  There are. 
c. That’s wrong.  There can’t be. 
d. That’s wrong.  There aren’t.10 
In this example, Mordecai’s responses in (a) and (c) are directed at the modal 
claim while (b) and (d) are directed at the prejacent.  von Fintel and Gillies claim 
that since these responses are appropriate things for Mordecai to say, the 
relativistic account should provide the proper flexibility with respect to the 
target of the responses.   
 In addition to the previous divergence between the target of denials and 
acceptances, von Fintel and Gillies claim that “a denial might not target the truth 
of the proposition expressed but the grounds for asserting that proposition.”11  
Their concern is that a might-claim is more than just an expression of ignorance 
about P.  When a speaker utters a sentence with a might-claim that includes a 
particular prejacent, the speaker is intending to express the idea that the 
prejacent is a state of affairs that should not be ignored.  They also claim that in 
many cases the speaker relies on positive evidence which leads them to believe 
                                                
10 Ibid. Pp. 83. 
11 Ibid. Pp. 83. 
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that the prejacent is indeed a real possibility.  This leads them to the following 
conclusion: 
a might claim might be open to reproach, retraction, or disavowal, as soon as it 
becomes clear that the speaker was relying on assumptions that were not 
reliable—or more generally, when it becomes clear that her epistemic state was 
not as it should have been—even though it is perfectly true that the prejacent 
was compatible with what the speaker knew. 12 
 
In other words, a retraction, etc., may be asserted on the grounds that the initial 
utterance was not asserted on acceptable grounds.  This means that the denial is 
not targeted at the truth of the initial proposition but the grounds on which the 
proposition was asserted. 
 Finally, von Fintel and Gillies identify their foremost concern about the 
motivating data as one of fitness: 
On the one hand, it is relatively easy to construct cases in which we have pretty 
robust intuitions that:  (i) a prior might-claim is perfectly acceptable; (ii) some 
intervening discourse reveals some new facts; and (iii) that same might-claim 
could not be acceptably uttered in the posterior situation.  But all parties are—or 
should be—agreed that no pro-CIA conclusion follows from this.  What is 
needed is evidence that the proposition expressed by the prior might-claim goes 
from true to false:  and that is the data that, roughly put, bridges the gap between 
denying an earlier claim and disagreeing with it.13 
 
They point out that our intuitions concerning occurrences in which speakers will 
retract the might-claims that they made in their earlier assertion but the examples 
have to be of a certain type.  The retractions have to be targeted at the 
proposition expressed in the earlier claim.  von Fintel and Gillies claim that 
because of this relativistic accounts rely on examples like the following: 
 
                                                
12 Ibid. Pp. 83. 
13 Ibid. Pp. 84. 
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a. What I said before was false. 
b. That is not true.14 
The problem, as von Fintel and Gillies see it, is that in cases like these the 
speaker’s intuitions are far less robust. 
Problems for a Relativistic Analysis 
 von Fintel and Gillies’ first objection to the relativist analysis is an attack 
on a prediction that they believe the relativist account must make with respect to 
time lag.  They correctly identify that CIA theories claim that “it is harder for 
simple might-claims to be true relative to an assessor in a later context of 
assessment a than it is for them to be true relative to an assessor in c the original 
context of utterance.”15  However, they don’t explain why or how CIA theories 
can make this prediction.  von Fintel and Gillies simply offer the following 
example to show that CIA theories do not capture our intuitions.  
Suppose we are putting a randomly chosen card in an envelope.  You catch a 
glimpse of the card and know that it is a black-suited face card.  You say (19a).  
Then, ten years later when we open the envelope—it’s the Jack of Clubs—we 
cannot complain with (19b) 
 
(19) a. You: It might be the King of Spades. 
                 b. Us (ten years later): ??Wrong!/What you said is false!16  
 
von Fintel and Gillies claim that the time-lagging phenomenon would be 
unexpected if CIA theories were capturing our intuitions.  They claim that we 
should feel that what was uttered in (19a) is false.  However, von Fintel and 
                                                
14 Ibid. Pp. 84. 
15 Ibid. Pp. 86. 
16 Ibid. Pp. 86. 
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Gillies are simply turning a blind eye to the essential feature of CIA theories, 
namely that sentences can be evaluated at contexts of assessment other than the 
original context of utterance.   
By appealing to this feature of the CIA theory the utterance in (19a) has a 
harder time being true as time goes on only when evaluated at a context of 
assessment that includes the information that the card is actually the Jack of 
Clubs.  von Fintel and Gillies claim that as time goes on (19a) has a harder time 
being true in the original context of utterance.  However, the information 
available at the later context of assessment is not available at the original context 
of utterance no matter how much time passes.  In a footnote, von Fintel and 
Gillies attempt to address this reaction by the CIA theorist: 
 
A CIA agent may well retreat to a weaker theory, claiming that not every point 
of assessment is a legitimate point of assessment—only eligible or relevant points 
count.  Invoking relevant assessors, the CIA can then explain why we cannot 
disagree over large gulfs of time.  To which we reply:  no matter the notion of 
relevance, it will be determined by features of context not by the point of 
assessment.  And we are the first to agree that limiting the extent to which CIA 
theories rely on the posited novel parameters reduces the implausible predictions 
such theories make.17   
 
 
Essentially, von Fintel and Gillies are claiming that if the CIA theorist develops a 
criterion for determining relevant assessors they can select only those assessors 
that accommodate the relativistic intuitions regarding time-lag.  What’s more, 
von Fintel and Gillies claim that the (dis)agreement will be determined by 
                                                
17 Ibid. Pp. 86. 
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features of context not the point of assessment.  However, I will not claim that 
not every point of assessment is a ‘legitimate’ point of assessment nor will I 
introduce the notion of ‘relevant assessors’.  I simply make use of the 
fundamental feature of the CIA theory as presented by MacFarlane.  Now, von 
Fintel and Gillies argue that the CIA theory under review theory is at odds with 
their intuitions about future information affecting the truth-value of past 
statements.  So, their first objection amounts to a denial of the primary feature of 
the CIA theory without an argument against this feature only a presentation of 
their intuitions regarding time-lag.  Since their first objection has been shown not 
to address any CIA theory I will not address the objection in my defense.  Let us 
now move on to their second objection, which is based on the function of tense 
operators. 
 von Fintel and Gillies point out correctly that unlike the contextualist 
approach in which the set of facts that the modals quantify over depends on the 
index (the world time pair), the CIA theory declares the index to be invisible to 
epistemic modals.18  They claim that since the CIA theory does not depend on the 
index there are problems that arise when sentences that have the modal 
embedded under tense operators are considered because “whatever shifting of 
                                                
18 The CIA theory considers the index to be invisible because it does not restrict the assessment parameters 
to its respective coordinates, e.g., (actual world, 10:00pm January 17 2010). 
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the time-coordinate that the tense operator does is promptly ignored by the 
modal.”19  They offer the following example to illustrate their point: 
Sophie is looking for some ice cream, and checks the freezer.  There is none in 
there.  Asked why she opened the freezer, she replies: 
 
a. There might have been ice cream in the freezer. 
b. PAST(might(ice cream in freezer))20 
von Fintel and Gillies claim that it is possible that the sentence that Sophie 
uttered was true even though she knew there was no ice cream in the freezer at 
the time she uttered the sentence.  But, they claim that the CIA theory they have 
under review cannot deal with this forecast.21 
 They think that the relativist will declare that the modal will place the 
tense operator on the evaluation of the prejacent so that the modal base picks out 
a set of worlds that is independent of the index.  So, for this example, since 
Sophie knows there is no ice cream in the freezer at the time of assessment, the 
modal base does not quantify over any worlds in which there is ice cream in the 
freezer.  Therefore, the might-claim embedded under the tense operator will turn 
out to be false.  von Fintel and Gillies see this as a major problem for the 
relativistic account because it would mean that many of the might-claims we 
make could be false when uttered in sentences constructed like the one in the 
preceding example, such that the tense operator outscopes the modal.  This claim 
will be addressed in my defense. 
                                                
19 Ibid. Pp. 87. 
20 Ibid. Pp. 87. 
21 Egan et al also make this observation. 
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 The next two objections that von Fintel and Gillies raise for the relativistic 
account will deal with differences available to the speaker and the evidence 
available to the assessor.  The first of the two objections deals with cases in which 
the assessor has less evidence available than the speaker does.  Before they level 
their attack, von Fintel and Gillies make the following caveat, “We will assume 
here that the CIA-analysis should extend to the dual of might:  must.  (If might 
and must are duals, it is hard to see how there is any room to favor CIA theories 
for one and not the other.)”22  Again, the relativistic analysis will hinge on the 
assessors evidence at the time of the assessment.  von Fintel and Gillies believe 
the CIA theory must predict that an assessor should reject any must-claim whose 
truth would exclude worlds that are compatible with the states of affairs that 
obtain in the context of assessment.  von Fintel and Gillies provide the following 
example in order to shed light upon the shortfall: 
The Boss has two informants, Jack and Zack.  There is a meeting of spies in a 
room, and The Boss, Jack and Zack know that one and only one of their 
(conveniently named) comrades P, Q, R is a turncoat.  Jack looks through his 
peep hole and sees clearly that it is either P or Q who is the turncoat, and Zack 
looks through his peep hole and sees clearly that it is either Q or R who is the 
turncoat.  Each slips The Boss a note informing him: 
 
a. [From Jack]:  It must be that either P is the turncoat or Q is the 
turncoat. 
b. [From Zack]:  It must be that either Q is the turncoat or R is the 
turncoat. 
The Boss gets the messages, concluding that Q is the turncoat.23 
                                                
22 Ibid. Pp. 88. 
23 Ibid. Pp. 88. 
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Now, by von Fintel and Gillies’ lights, the CIA theory cannot account for this 
exchange.  For, at the Boss’ context of assessment, both Jack’s and Zack’s 
sentences are false because the Boss has no information about who the turncoat is 
and the modal base will contain P-worlds, Q-worlds, and R-worlds.  Since the 
modal base contains all three worlds, both Jack and Zack’s sentences end up 
being false.  Clearly, this is not an acceptable outcome for the relativistic 
approach.  This point will also be addressed in my positive account of the 
relativistic analysis. 
 Next, von Fintel and Gillies discuss examples in which the assessor has 
more evidence than the speaker does.  They claim that the CIA theory would 
predict a rejection of any might-claim whose truth-value, with respect to the 
context of assessment, would call for worlds that are incompatible with the states 
of affairs that obtain in the context of assessment.  But, von Fintel and Gillies 
point out that “we can easily agree to an epistemic modal might ϕ in conversation 
when we know whether ϕ.”24  They offer the following example: 
After some rounds where Mordecai gives Pascal hints about the solution, Pascal 
says:   
There might be two reds. 
   
Mordecai—who knows the solution—can reply by agreeing with the modal 
claim:   
That’s right.  There might be.25 
                                                
24 Ibid. Pp. 90. 
25 Ibid. Pp. 90. 
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von Fintel and Gillies argue that if disagreement cases are the motivating data for 
the CIA theory, then examples like the previous one should force us in a different 
direction.  In the example, Mordecai knows the exact amount of reds that are left 
so, Pascal’s might-claim is either false at Mordecai’s point of assessment, or “his 
reply violates the maxim of quantity”.26  Now, von Fintel and Gillies are correct 
to point out the lack of accountability the relativistic account under review has 
when it comes to this case.  However, this is one of the cases that sparked my 
idea of contextual projection. 
Next, von Fintel and Gillies’ set their sights on sentences containing the 
disjunction of two existential modal claims.  They refer to a previous example: 
Sally does not know where Joe is, but she knows he is in either Boston or New 
York.  She says:   
Joe might be in Boston or he might be in New York 
    
This entails two might-claims: 
a. Joe might be in Boston. 
b. Joe might be in New York.27 
 
von Fintel and Gillies show that the CIA theory under review would predict that 
if Sally uttered the unified disjunct in the presence of anyone who knows Joe’s 
location, they would disagree with her claim.  They would disagree because the 
unified disjunction entails the separate disjuncts and the CIA theory calls for one 
                                                
26 Ibid. Pp. 90. 
27 Ibid. Pp. 90. 
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or the other to be false at any point of assessment that includes the knowledge of 
Joe’s location.  Their point is illustrated by the strangeness of George’s reply in 
the first exchange and Sally’s reply in the second: 
1. a. Sally: Joe might be in Boston or he might be in New York. 
b. George:  ??Nah/That’s false.  He’s in New York. 
 
 2. a. Sally:  Joe might be in Boston or he might be in New York. 
  b. George:  he can’t be in Boston.  He’s in New York this week. 
  c. Sally:  ??Oh, then I guess I was wrong.28 
Next, von Fintel and Gillies consider might-claims that are embedded 
under factives.  They point out that “factives—like realize—presuppose the truth 
of their complements”29 and they plan to show that “might can embed under 
realize even when both speaker and assessor think the complement of the might-
claim is false.”30  According to the CIA theory under review, there should be 
presupposition failure in cases where the modals embed under factives.  They 
provide the following example to illustrate their concerns: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
28 Ibid.  Pp. 91. 
29 Ibid. Pp. 93. 
30 Ibid. Pp. 93. 
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Blofeld and Number 2 are at SPECTRE headquarters plotting Bond’s demise.  
Bond planted a bug, and some misleading evidence pointing to his being in 
Zurich, and slipped out.  Now he and Leiter are listening in from London.  As 
they listen, Leiter is getting a bit worried:  Blofeld hasn’t yet found the 
misleading evidence that points to Bond being in Zurich.  Leiter turns to Bond 
and says: 
 
If Blofeld realizes you might be in Zurich, you can breathe easy—he’ll 
send his henchmen to Zurich to find you. 
 
And he might continue: 
 
If he doesn’t realize soon that you might be in Zurich, we better get out 
of here. 
 
Bond shuts his briefcase, straightens his tie, and tells Miss Moneypenny his 
martini may have to wait.  But what he does not and cannot do is complain to 
Leiter that he isn’t in Zurich.31   
 
von Fintel and Gillies point out that this example would be contrary to what the 
CIA theory would call for.  For, both Bond and Leiter know that Bond is not in 
Zurich and as von Fintel and Gillies put it, “any plausible way of drawing the 
boundaries locates Bond—and Leiter—in a point of assessment a determining a 
modal base…that has only not-Zurich-worlds in it.”32  This is clearly not what we 
want because the relativistic account turns out to offer explanations that are 
contrary to the empirical facts.  So, let us now turn to my defense of the 
relativistic analysis. 
Plugging the Leak 
First, let me start with the thesis of the relativistic analysis; epistemic 
modals quantify over the possibilities that are functions of the evidence available 
                                                
31 Ibid. Pp. 93. 
32 Ibid. Pp. 94. 
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within a context of assessment.  Let us recall one of von Fintel and Gillies’ earlier 
examples: 
a. Alex:  The keys might be in the drawer. 
b. Billy:  [Looks in the drawer, agitated] They’re not.  Why did you say 
that? 
c. Alex:  Look, I didn’t say they were in the drawer.  I said they might have 
been.  Sheesh.33 
 
Now, if we look at Alex’s response in (c) we see that she is defending her 
earlier might-claim because she can assess the claim at the context in which the 
claim was made.  Alex realizes that the newly acquired evidence—the keys not 
being in the drawer—was not included in the context of her might-claim.  Alex is 
free to evaluate the might-claim at its original context in order to defend her 
justification for making this claim.  What’s more, Alex is also free to assess the 
might-claim at a context that does include the newly acquired evidence.  The 
following exchange illustrates my point: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
33 Ibid. Pp. 81. 
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a. Alex:  The keys might be in the drawer. 
b. Billy:  [Looks in the drawer, agitated] They’re not.  Why did you say 
that? 
(i) Alex:  Look, I didn’t say they were in the drawer.  
I said they might be there—and for all I knew at 
that time—they might have been.   
(ii) Alex:  Look, I didn’t say they were in the drawer.  
I said they might be there—and they might have 
been—but, as it turns out they weren’t.  If I 
would have known that the keys were not in the 
drawer I would not have said that they might 
have been. 
Now, we see in (i) that Alex is defending her might-claim by assessing the claim 
at the context of utterance and in (ii) she is defending her might-claim by 
assessing the claim at the context of utterance and she is retracting her claim by 
assessing it at the context of assessment, which incorporates the new evidence.  
The ability to evaluate an utterance at points of assessment other than the 
original context of utterance is what I call contextual projection.  In essence, we 
are able to project our evaluation of an utterance to any point of assessment that 
lies on the continuum between when the sentence was uttered and the present.  
This sounds technical but the common way to express this idea is ‘taking a look 
from a different point of view’.  Now, it is important to remember that the 
contextual features of the particular points of assessment are what is used to 
evaluate the given statement.  Therefore, it is the contextual parameters that 
Dauer, Jeff , 2009, UMSL, p. 22 
provide the criterion for truth, not the psychology of the assessor inhabiting that 
point of assessment. 
By incorporating the idea of contextual projection the relativistic analysis 
can account for both Alex’s defense of the propriety and truth of her might-
claim—when assessed at the context of utterance—and it can also account for the 
retraction of her claim—when assessed at the context of assessment that includes 
the new evidence—which picks out the genuine disagreement any semantic 
analysis of epistemic modals must account for. 
 Now, barring the introduction of contextual projection, von Fintel and 
Gillies do not think that their previous example shows what they take to be the 
real motivating force behind the relativistic account, namely, genuine 
disagreement.  So, they offer the following example to show that “denials don’t 
always attach to the attitude claim (and sometimes cannot); the same goes for 
agreement”34: 
a.  A:  I think it’s raining out. 
b. (i) B:  No, it isn’t/No, it can’t be. 
(ii) B:  ??No, you don’t.35 
 
As stated before, B’s felicitous denial in (i) does not represent a genuine 
disagreement with A’s utterance.  However, B’s utterance in (ii) does represent a 
                                                
34 Ibid. Pp. 83. 
35 Ibid. Pp. 82. 
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genuine disagreement but, the utterance is not felicitous.   von Fintel and Gillies 
point out that when epistemic modals are introduced the problem gets worse 
because subsequent replies can be directed at either the modal claim itself or the 
prejacent.  So, they offer the following example to show that “flexibility in the 
target of denials and acceptances does not explain what needs explaining”36: 
Pascal and Mordecai are playing Mastermind.  After some rounds where 
Mordecai gives Pascal hints about the solution, Pascal says: 
 There might be two reds. 
 Mordecai, knowing the solution, has a range of possible responses: 
a. That’s right.  There might be. 
b. That’s right.  There are. 
c. That’s wrong.  There can’t be. 
d. That’s wrong.  There aren’t.37 
von Fintel and Gillies are correct to point out that Mordecai’s responses in (a) 
and (c) are directed at the modal claim while (b) and (d) are directed at the 
prejacent.  They also claim that since these responses are appropriate things for 
Mordecai to say, the relativist analysis should provide the proper flexibility with 
respect to the target of the responses but it does not.  So, let us employ the notion 
of contextual projection. 
 Armed with contextual projection, the relativistic analysis can provide the 
proper flexibility to allow for all of Mordecai’s responses.  In (a), Mordecai is 
                                                
36 Ibid. Pp. 83. 
37 Ibid. Pp. 83. 
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assessing Pascal’s utterance in the context in which it was uttered and he is 
agreeing with Pascal’s might-claim.  In (b), Mordecai is assessing Pascal’s 
utterance in the context that incorporates his knowledge of the game and he 
graciously informs Pascal of the current state of their game in which there are 
two reds.  In (c), Mordecai is assessing Pascal’s utterance in the context in which 
it was uttered but he is disagreeing with Pascal’s might-claim.  In (d), Mordecai is 
assessing Pascal’s utterance in the context that incorporates his knowledge of the 
game and he graciously informs Pascal of the current state of their game in 
which there are not two reds. 
 Next, von Fintel and Gillies claim that “a denial might not target the truth 
of the proposition expressed but the grounds for asserting that proposition.”38  
Their point is that a might-claim is more than just an expression of ignorance 
about P.  The proper way to read a sentence with a might-claim that includes a 
particular prejacent is to read the sentence as expressing the idea that the 
prejacent is a possibility that should not be ignored.  What’s more, von Fintel and 
Gillies point out that in many cases the speaker relies on positive evidence that 
leads them to believe that the prejacent is indeed a ‘real’ possibility.  From this, 
they conclude that a retraction, etc., may be asserted on the condition that the 
initial utterance was not asserted on acceptable grounds, which means the denial 
is not targeted at the truth of the initial proposition but the grounds on which the 
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proposition was asserted.  The following is an example where the speaker was 
relying on assumptions that were not reliable: 
My wife and I have decided to do some remodeling in our house.  My cousin 
Steve is a carpenter and we want him to come over and do the work for us. 
a. Jeff:  Steve might be able to install the carpet in the living room. 
b. Elaine:  No, I talked to Steve and he said that he doesn’t know how to install 
the carpet in our living room that is not a carpentry skill. 
c. Jeff:  Oh, OK, I was wrong to assume that he would know how to install 
carpet by virtue of the fact that he is a carpenter.    
Now, let us apply contextual projection.  In this case, Jeff’s retraction is targeted 
at the initial might-claim he made in (a).  He is justified in retracting his initial 
claim because he is assessing the claim at a context that includes the new 
evidence about his faulty assumptions.  What’s more, Jeff can claim that it was 
both appropriate and true, relative his context of assessment in (a), to say that 
Steve might have been able to install the carpet because the evidence introduced 
in (b) was not available to him in the context of (a).  This analysis satisfies von 
Fintel and Gillies’ demand for a retraction that targets the proposition expressed 
in the initial might-claim.   
 From here, von Fintel and Gillies move on to their objection that is based 
on the function of tense operators.  Their claim is that since relativistic accounts 
declare the index to be invisible to epistemic modals, problems arise when the 
modal is embedded under a tense operator, specifically, that “whatever shifting 
of the time-coordinate that the tense operator does is promptly ignored by the 
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modal.”39  As mentioned above, they offer the following example to illustrate 
their point: 
Sophie is looking for some ice cream, and checks the freezer.  There is none in 
there.  Asked why she opened the freezer, she replies: 
 
a. There might have been ice cream in the freezer. 
b. PAST)might(ice cream in freezer))40 
Now, as the relativistic analysis stands without contextual projection, the modal 
will place the tense operator on the evaluation of the prejacent so that the modal 
base picks out a set of worlds that is independent of the index.  For this example, 
since Sophie knows that there is no ice cream in the freezer at the time of 
assessment, the modal does not quantify over any worlds in which ice cream is 
in the freezer.  Therefore, the might-claim that is embedded under the tense 
operator will turn out to be false.  However, if we incorporate contextual 
projection into the relativistic analysis, we can see how it is possible for the 
sentence that Sophie uttered to be true even though she knew that there was no 
ice cream in the freezer.  Sophie can evaluate her might-claim at the context of 
action(checking the freezer) via contextual projection: 
Sophie is looking for some ice cream, and checks the freezer.  There is none in 
there.  Asked why she opened the freezer, she replies: 
 
a. There might have been ice cream in the freezer. 
b. PAST(might(ice cream in freezer))41 
                                                
39 Ibid. Pp. 87. 
40 Ibid. Pp. 87. 
41 Ibid. Pp. 87. 
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Sophie’s reply is justifying her checking of the freezer for ice cream because the 
context in which she checked the freezer did not contain the knowledge that 
there was no ice cream in the freezer.  So, Sophie can account for the propriety 
and truth of her utterance when she assesses her claim at the context of action—
checking the refrigerator—and she can account for the propriety and falsity of 
her utterance when she assesses her claim at the context in which the knowledge 
of the freezer’s contents is available.  Therefore, ala contextual projection, the 
relativistic account allows for the modal to accommodate the shifting of the time-
coordinate the tense operator calls for. 
 von Fintel and Gillies then move on to an objection based on the 
differences between the evidence available to the speaker and the evidence 
available to the assessor.  Before marshalling their attack, von Fintel and Gillies 
make the following assumption, “we will assume here that the CIA-analysis 
should extend to the dual of might:  must.  (If might and must are duals, it is hard 
to see how there is any room to favor CIA theories for one and not the other.)”42  
Now, von Fintel and Gillies believe the relativist account must predict that an 
assessor should reject any must-claim whose truth would exclude worlds that are 
compatible with the states of affairs that obtain at the context of assessment.  
They provide the following example to shed light on the supposed shortfall of 
the relativistic account: 
                                                
42 Ibid. Pp. 88. 
Dauer, Jeff , 2009, UMSL, p. 28 
The Boss has two informants, Jack and Zack.  There is a meeting of spies in a 
room, and The Boss, Jack and Zack know that one and only one of their 
(conveniently named) comrades P, Q, R is a turncoat.  Jack looks through his 
peep hole and sees clearly that it is either P or Q who is the turncoat, and Zack 
looks through his peep hole and sees clearly that it is either Q or R who is the 
turncoat.  Each slips The Boss a note informing him: 
 
a. [From Jack]:  It must be that either P is the turncoat or Q is the turncoat. 
b. [From Zack]:  It must be that either Q is the turncoat or R is the turncoat.   
The Boss gets the messages, concluding that Q is the turncoat.43 
 
von Fintel and Gillies claim that the relativist analysis cannot account for 
this exchange because at the Boss’ context of assessment, both sentences, Jack’s 
and Zack’s, are false since The Boss has no information about who the turncoat 
is, therefore the modal base will contain P-worlds, Q-worlds, and R-worlds.  But 
this is not how the exchange would go.  The Boss would assess each of the claims 
at the context in which the claims were made.  The Boss would assess Jack’s 
claim at the context in which Jack made the claim which includes the disjunction 
of either P or Q and he would assess Zack’s claim at the context in which Zack 
made the claim which includes the disjunction of either Q or R.  So, both Jack and 
Zack’s statements are appropriate and true when assessed at the context in 
which they were uttered.  Hence, The Boss could accurately conclude that the 
turncoat is Q by eliminating the non-recurring variables.  The modal base does 
not contain P-worlds, Q-worlds, and R-worlds because The Boss can accept the 
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truth of both claims—by assessing them at the respective contexts in which they 
were made—so that he may arrive at the conclusion.44 
Next, von Fintel and Gillies discuss examples in which the assessor has 
more evidence than the speaker does.  They reason that the relativistic account 
would predict a rejection of any might-claim whose truth-value, with respect to 
the context of assessment, would call for worlds that are incompatible with the 
facts in the context of assessment.  But, von Fintel and Gillies point out that “we 
can easily agree to an epistemic modal might ϕ in conversation when we know 
whether ϕ.”45  Let us refer to the earlier example where Mordecai and Pascal are 
playing Mastermind: 
 
After some rounds where Mordecai gives Pascal hints about the solution, Pascal 
says: 
  There might be two reds. 
 
Mordecai—who knows the solution—can reply by agreeing with the the modal 
claim: 
  That’s right.  There might be. 
 
von Fintel and Gillies argue that if disagreement cases are the motivating data for 
the relativistic analysis, then examples like this one should force us to object to 
Mordecai’s response.  In the example, Mordecai knows the exact amount of reds 
                                                
44 Something needs to be said here concerning the idea of updating.  The relativist does not have to deny 
that it is impossible for an evaluator to update his epistemic state; for, in this example that is exactly what 
the boss is doing by assessing the claims at different contexts.  So, contextual projection can indeed be seen 
as updating. 
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that are left so they think that Pascal’s might-claim “is either false at the point of 
assessment he occupies (if there aren’t two reds) or his reply violates the maxim 
of quantity (if there are).”46  On the other hand, if we incorporate contextual 
projection into the relativistic analysis, we can account for Mordecai’s response. 
 In this example, Mordecai is assessing Pascal’s claim at the context in 
which the claim was uttered.  So, the evidence of the two reds is not available in 
the context in which Pascal makes his might-claim making the claim both 
appropriate and true.  Mordecai is assessing Pascal’s claim at the context in 
which it was uttered so he can appropriately agree with Pascal by saying that 
there might be two reds.  Now, Mordecai’s utterance “That’s right.  There might 
be.” Is true when assessed at a context that does not include the knowledge of 
the two reds and false when assessed at a context that does include the 
knowledge of the two reds.  By utilizing contextual projection, the relativist 
analysis can account for Mordecai’s intuitive response. 
 von Fintel and Gillies’ next objection centers on the disjunction of two 
existential modal claims.  Let us refer to their previous example: 
Sally doe not know where Joe is, but she knows he is either in Boston or New 
York.  She says: 
   Joe might be in Boston or he might be in New York 
 
 This entails two might-claims. 
a. Joe might be in Boston 
b. Joe might be in New York. 
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Now, we recall von Fintel and Gillies as having shown that the relativistic 
account would predict that if Sally uttered the unified disjunction in the presence 
of anyone who knows Joe’s location, they would disagree with her claim.  They 
would disagree because the unified disjunction entails the separate disjuncts and 
the relativistic analysis calls for one or the other to be false at any point of 
assessment that includes the knowledge of Joe’s location.  Their point is 
illustrated by the strangeness of George’s reply in the first exchange and Sally’s 
reply in the second: 
a. Sally:  Joe might be in Boston or he might be in New York. 
b. George:  ??Nah/That’s false.  He’s in New York 
 
a. Sally:  Joe might be in Boston or he might be in New York. 
b. George:  He can’t be in Boston.  He’s in New York this week. 
c. Sally:  ??Oh, then I guess I was wrong.47  
Under the new relativistic analysis, George’s response in the first exchange does 
not seem so strange because he is assessing Sally’s binary might-claim at a context 
in which the knowledge of Joe’s location is available.  What he said is 
appropriate and true when assessed from his context of utterance.  But, he could 
also agree with Sally’s binary claim if he assesses it from the context in which 
Sally’s utterance was made.  What’s more, Sally’s response in the second 
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exchange can be explained by my analysis.  In the example, Sally says “Oh, then I 
guess I was wrong” because she is assessing her previous might-claim at a 
context in which the knowledge of Joe’s location is made available to her.  
Furthermore, Sally can justify her previous claim by pointing to the fact that 
when the claim is assessed at the context in which it was uttered the claim is both 
appropriate and true.  Again, armed with contextual projection, the relativistic 
analysis can accommodate our intuitions about how exchanges like the one in the 
previous example would go. 
 Now, we come to von Fintel and Gillies’ final objection to the relativistic 
account.  This objection centers on the activity of might-claims that are embedded 
under factives.  They point out that “factives—like realize—presuppose the truth 
of their complements” and they try to show that “might can embed under realize 
even when both speaker and assessor think the complement of the might-claim is 
false.”48  They claim the relativistic account should predict that there would be 
presupposition failure in cases where the modals are embedded under factives.  
Let us consider their example: 
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Blofeld and Number 2 are at SPECTRE headquarters plotting Bond’s demise.  
Bond planted a bug, and some misleading evidence pointing to his being in 
Zurich, and slipped out.  Now he and Leiter are listening in from London.  As 
they listen, Leiter is getting a bit worried:  Blofeld hasn’t yet found the 
misleading evidence that points to Bond being in Zurich.  Leiter turns to Bond 
and says: 
 
If Blofeld realizes you might be in Zurich, you can breathe easy—he’ll 
send his henchmen to Zurich to find you. 
 
 And he might continue: 
 
If he doesn’t realize soon that you might be in Zurich, we better get out 
of here. 
 
Bond shuts his briefcase, straightens his tie, and tells Miss Moneypenny his 
martini may have to wait.  But what he does not and cannot do is complain to 
Leiter that he isn’t in Zurich.49 
 
 
But this is just another case where Leiter’s speech is a function of his appreciation 
for the context in which Blofeld and Number 2 are acting.  Leiter is assessing the 
information he receives from the bug at the context in which Blofeld and 
Number two are acting.  Then he is using the information from that context 
when he speaks to Bond.  Of course, Bond and Leiter both know that Bond is not 
in Zurich so if they were to assess the actions of Blofeld and Number 2 at their 
current context, the modal base would have only not-Zurich worlds in it but, 
they are not assessing the actions of Blofeld and Number 2 at their current 
context.  They are using the information they generate by assessing Blofeld and 
Number 2’s actions at the context in which the actions are occurring.  We can see 
                                                
49 Ibid. Pp. 93. 
Dauer, Jeff , 2009, UMSL, p. 34 
how information that is gained by assessing the actions at the context in which 
the actions are taking place can be used in a context that includes the plans of 
Bond and Leiter.   
No Ad Hocery Here 
I will now address the objection that the introduction of contextual 
projection is ad hoc.  I assume that the first line of attack would be to say that it is 
silly to think that we have the right to assess sentences containing modal claims 
at any context we choose.  However, it seems to me that contextual projection 
happens all the time.  Any time you here someone say things like “If I were you I 
would…”, “That’s not what I would have thought if I were her”, “She said P 
because at that time she didn’t know that Q”, etc., you are observing contextual 
projection.  Consider the following example: 
Mary and John are playing a game of chess.  Mary is a pretty good player but she 
is not able to look more than one move ahead.  John knows this and he plans to 
exploit Mary’s weakness during the game.  It is John’s turn and he thinks to 
himself: 
John: [If I move my queen one space forward Mary will not realize that I am 
setting the stage to take her bishop.  If I were her,  I would not realize 
that my(John’s) move would place my(Mary’s) bishop in danger, so, I 
would move my(Mary’s) pawn up one space after I(John) move 
my(John’s) bishop. 
John moves his queen; Mary moves her pawn; and John takes her bishop. 
 
In this example, John is assessing the game at Mary’s context so he can use the 
information he gains from ‘seeing the game through her eyes’ to win the game.  
John is evaluating the game from Mary’s point of view.  His best chance to ‘see 
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the game through her eyes’ is to evaluate the game from the context at which 
Mary is acting.  John’s freedom to evaluate the game from different contexts of 
assessment is an example of contextual projection.  The same type of contextual 
projection takes place in one of von Fintel and Gillies’ examples: 
a. Alex:  The keys might be in the drawer. 
b. Billy:  [Looks in the drawer, agitated] They’re not.  Why did you say that? 
c. Alex:  Look, I didn’t say they were in the drawer.  I said they might be there—
and they might have been.  Sheesh.  
Alex’s reply in (c) is a defense of her earlier might-claim.  She is justified in 
defending her claim because she is free to assess her earlier might-claim at the 
context in which it was uttered, a context in which her statement was both true 
and appropriate. 
Conclusion 
I am not claiming that contextual projection is a normative concept; I am 
simply identifying a phenomenon that occurs in our world we just call it by 
another name, empathy.  We use empathy as a tool to help understand the 
thoughts and feelings of those we come in contact with.  Similarly, we use 
contextual projection as a tool to evaluate modal claims so that we may make use 
of information that may reveal itself at contexts other than the initial context of 
utterance.  It seems to me that in order to argue against the idea of contextual 
projection, one would have to show that either the phenomenon does not occur 
or that contextual projection does not supply the relativistic analysis with the 
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tools needed to provide an accurate semantic analysis of epistemic modals.  
Furthermore, the relativistic approach, and contextual projection in particular, 
should not be taken seriously just because it is serviceable.  Relativism, armed 
with contextual projection, should be taken seriously because we do indeed 
evaluate the world around us from contexts of assessment.  However, I am sure 
that attacks will be made on the veracity of contextual projection with respect to 
a proper semantic theory of epistemic modals.  But, who knows, my relativistic 
account just might hold up. 
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